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ABSTRACT 
 The role played by parental wealth in facilitating the life chances and 
living standards of offspring is a topic of growing interest in stratification 
research.  The addition of household wealth to the parental resource portfolio 
opens new issues with respect to mechanisms in the transmission of advantage 
across generations, since wealth transfers can take place at different points 
along the life course, in varying amounts, and for different purposes.  This 
paper examines the impact of parental wealth and transfers of wealth on 
several aspects of the homeownership decision--the timing of the purchase, the 
cost of the home, and the downpayment proportion, as well as living standards 
subsequent to the purchase.  We utilize a unique data set from France which 
contains information on parental wealth and wealth transfers from both sets of 
parents of a couple, as well as details on the timing of transfers in relation 
to a home purchase.  The results make clear the complex pathways by which 
parental wealth influences the tenancy arrangements and living standards of 
offspring. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The impact of parental resources on the life chances of offspring is a 
theme that has received much attention in the stratification literature.  In 
early studies based on the socioeconomic attainment paradigm (e.g., Blau and 
Duncan 1967; Jencks, et. al. 1972) the outcome variables of primary interest 
were the occupational achievements and earnings of children, and the parental 
resources that were stressed were father’s education and occupational status.  
In more recent investigations the array of resource items has been broadened to 
include both maternal characteristics and the assets of parents, and the range 
of outcome measures has similarly been extended to encompass a variety of 
aspects of the well-being of children (e.g., Conley 1999; Attias-Donfut 1995; 
Mayer 1997; Spilerman 2004). 
Household wealth is probably the most significant addition to the parental 
resource portfolio.  Inclusion of this asset has altered our imagery of the 
transfer process in two ways.  First, it has heightened the emphasis on 
financial and material resources, in comparison with socialization effects.  In 
the earlier formulations, in which parental education and occupational status 
were stressed, it was presumed that the main pathway by which parental resources 
exerted its influence on children's attainment was through the promotion of 
attitudes, values, and aspirations conducive to labor market success (Hauser 
1971; Sewell and Shah 1968; Duncan, et. al. 1972), though the benefits of 
parental income and wealth were certainly appreciated (Henretta and Cambell 
1978; Rumberger 1983).  However, it was only with the formal expansion of the 
parental resource array that the role played by financial and material assets in 
the transmission of advantage could be explicitly modeled (Spilerman 2000). 
Second, before the inclusion of parental wealth, when the inter-
generational effects were sought in value transmissions, it was appropriate to 
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associate parental resources with a respondent’s teenage years, the period when 
socialization processes have their peak impact on children’s decisions in regard 
to schooling and occupational choice.  Indeed, this is the age point at which 
parental background characteristics were measured in the early studies of 
socioeconomic achievement
1
.  However, a consideration of parental financial and 
material assets, and transfers of the assets, requires a recognition that the 
transmissions can take place at multiple points along the life course and in 
varying amounts.  This opens issues of the timing of parental allocations, the 
sums transferred, and the intended purpose of the assistance--issues that do not 
arise when the parental resource array is limited to measures of educational 
attainment and occupational status.
2
 
Transfers of parental wealth can influence the life chances and well-being 
of offspring in several ways: the transmissions can be targeted to enhance 
permanent income (e.g., investments in schooling; assistance with opening a 
business), support living standards (e.g., aid with the purchase of a home or an 
auto), insulate offspring from the financial trauma of job loss or illness, or 
the transfers can be used to build up the net worth of children.  Parental 
wealth effects have been examined with regard to all these outcomes (e.g., Boehm 
and Schlottmann 2002; Torche and Spilerman 2006; McGarry and Schoeni 1995; Lindh 
and Ohlsonn 1998), though it is probably the case that the greatest attention 
has been given to the investigation of parental transfer effects on the home 
acquisition decision. 
Home ownership is recognized as a significant factor in the economic well 
being of households.  For working and middle class families housing equity is 
often the item of greatest value in their asset portfolio (e.g., Orzechowski and 
Sepielli [2003] on the US; Hamnett, et. al. [1991, chap 3] on England; 
Brandolini et. al. [2006] on Italy; Arrondel and Lefebvre [2001] on France).  
                                                 
1
OCG I, the survey used by Blau and Duncan (1967) asked about parental 
characteristics when the respondent was age 16.  This same age was also the 
reference point about parental status in the study by Featherman and Hauser 
(1978). 
 
2
A consideration of financial transfers also opens up matters of “backward 
flows” of resources from children to parents, and the possible interaction 
between public transfer programs and private family transfers.  See Attias-
Donfut (2003) and Kohli (1999) for discussions of these topics. 
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Moreover, homeownership has served as a crucial vehicle in the buildup of 
household wealth (Belsky and Prakken 2004; Boehm and Schlottmann 2004), a 
consequence of the secular rise in home values in western countries since World 
War II, accentuated by the leveraged nature of a home purchase.  Additionally, 
homeownership is treated favorably in the tax laws of many countries; see, for 
example, Bernardi and Poggio (2004) on Italy; Diamond and Lea (1992, chap. 3) on 
France.  In the U.S., real estate taxes can be deducted from federal taxable 
income and there is an exclusion from taxes of $500,000 from the profit of a 
home sale.  Thus, while tenancy choice may reflect a life style preference 
rather than an investment calculation, families that selected homeownership have 
typically seen their net worth grow over the years.
3
  
There are also externalities from home ownership that can enhance the life 
chances of children.  Where parents own their residence, then, net of other 
background characteristics, the offspring have fewer behavioral problems 
(Haurin, et. al. 2002), are more likely to complete secondary education and 
undertake college study (Aronson 2000; Boehm and Schlottmann 1999), avoid public 
welfare in their adult years (Harkness and Newman 2003), abstain from having 
children while teenagers (Green and White 1997), and become homeowners 
themselves (Boehm and Schlottmann 2002; Kurz 2004; Pla and Cabrerizo 2004).  
While there are methodological problems with several of these studies, 
especially the failure to distinguish homeownership effects from pure wealth 
effects, the findings are consistent with other documented consequences of 
homeownership: greater residential stability and an interest in protecting 
property values, such as by surpressing neighborhood crime and ensuring quality 
schools (Lee et. al. 1994; Harkness and Newman 2002; Rossi and Weber 1996). 
In light of these extensive effects of home ownership, the role played by 
parental resources in facilitating a home purchase has hardly been ignored by 
researchers.  In particular, parental assistance has been found to reduce the 
waiting time from marriage to ownership--a finding that has been replicated in 
                                                 
3
As of this writing, in mid 2009, the real estate crisis is in full bloom and 
housing prices are much depressed.  Our analysis refers to the long time period 
from the end of World War II through early 2008.  In the US, this period was 
characterized by a secular increase in home prices with only brief reversals in 
the trend.  Whether or not home ownership will retain its status as a vehicle 
for equity buildup in the population remains to be seen. 
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many western countries (e.g., Mulder and Wagner 1998 [West Germany and the 
Netherlands]; Kurz 2004 [West Germany]; Guiso and Jappelli 1999 [Italy]; Lewin-
Epstein, et. al. 2004 [Israel}; Mayer and Engelhardt 1996 [United States], 
thought not in some Latin American states
4
 (Torche and Spilerman 2006).  Because 
the financial sums transferred can be considerable and because early entrance 
into homeownership provides a longer duration in which to accrue the economic 
returns from this tenancy status, several authors (e.g. Kurz 2004; Boehm and 
Schlottmann (2002) have come to view parental assistance with a home purchase as 
a critical vehicle in the transmission of parental wealth across the 
generational divide. 
A limitation of this literature stems from the paucity of attention given 
to the alternative pathways by which parents can assist their children with the 
acquisition of a home.  The availability of parental funds can affect a young 
couple’s calculations in several ways: the transfers can be used to shorten the 
waiting time to homeownership, permit a larger downpayment, or enable a 
residence of greater value to be acquired.  Only the first of these options has 
been the focus of sustained research--the literature noted in the prior 
paragraph--though some work has been done on the other pathways (e.g., Englehard 
and Mayer 1998; Gusio and Jappelli 1999). 
Yet all three must be considered as they represent different routes by 
which parents contribute to the acquisition of a home and thereby to living 
standards; indeed, a focus solely on the waiting time will underestimate the 
magnitude of the full parental effect.  In Chile, for example, parental 
resources have but a modest impact on the waiting time to ownership but strongly 
influence the value of an acquired residence (Torche and Spilerman 2006).  
Similarly, by facilitating a larger downpayment a parental transfer can reduce 
monthly mortgage costs, thereby permitting a higher level of non-housing 
consumption to be maintained (Engelhardt and Mayer 1998).  In short, to 
understand the details of how parental assistance influences the home 
                                                 
4
In Chile, and elsewhere in Latin America, there is much squatter tenancy, often 
on government owned land.  In population surveys, respondents with such housing 
usually respond that they are homeowners though they lack legal title.  See de 
Soto (2000) on untitled assets in developing countries. 
 5
acquisition process, it is necessary to consider the full panoply of uses of the 
parental funds, rather than restricting attention to a single component. 
In the present study we use a unique data set from France, the Actifs 
Financiers Survey (Survey of Financial Assets) conducted by INSEE in 1991-92, 
which permits us to investigate the parental effects on each component of the 
home acquisition process.  Moreover, with these data we can correct for the 
possible endogeneity of the parental transfers and model the joint determination 
of the downpayment proportion and the value of the home.  That is, a purchaser 
may know, more or less, the total sum that will be available from parents and 
then decides how much to allocate to the downpayment, and how much to acquiring 
a more costly home.  But this means that the error terms in the two outcome 
variables--downpayment proportion and home value--will be correlated and the 
estimation procedure should take this into account. 
 
 
II. INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND HOME OWNERSHIP IN FRANCE 
 
 The tenancy pattern and home ownership rate in a country are deeply 
influenced by governmental policies and by the generosity of financial supports 
available to builders, homeowners, and renters.  Attempts to make sense of the 
diversity of housing policies in Europe have given rise to a number of 
typologies of housing systems, some based on Esping-Anderson's (1990) seminal 
classification of welfare states (e.g. Barlow and Duncan [1994]).  Equally 
useful are typologies that derive from the structure of the housing market or 
from the housing statistics categories used by the individual countries.   
Kemeny (2001) emphasizes the state's role in the organization of the 
rental market as a factor underlying the prevalence of the different tenancy 
types--co-residence with parents, market rental, public housing, and home 
ownership.  Central to his scheme is the distinction between dual and unitary 
rental markets.  In countries with a dual market system the state assumes 
responsibility for the provision of rental housing for poor families, separating 
this segment of the rental market from the private, profit-seeking sector.  The 
result is a system with two distinct rental markets, one subsidized, the other 
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demanding market prices.  In contrast, in countries with a unitary rental 
market, access to public housing is not limited to poor families; rather, the 
profit-seeking sector must compete for tenants with the public sector.  As a 
result, rents in the profit-seeking market are kept low, and the distinction 
between the two sectors is minimized. 
Kemeny argues that the type of rental market system prevalent in a country 
bears strong implications for the home ownership rate.  In the dualist system 
(e.g., England, U.S.), where all but the very poor confront high rents, the 
possibility of home ownership is an attractive alternative to renting.  But in a 
unitary system (e.g., Germany, Denmark), where private sector rents are kept low 
by competition from public housing, rental tenancy is able to compete with home 
ownership.  Data presented by Kemeny (2001, p. 67) for six European countries 
support his thesis: the countries characterized by a unitary system have 
considerably lower rates of home ownership.  While France was not included in 
Kemeny's study, in terms of its rental policy (outlined below), it clearly falls 
into the unitary sector. 
A variant classification of home ownership rates was suggested by Poggio 
(2006).  Poggio speaks of "lands of tenure choice," where rental housing is 
available at a modest price so that the decision to own is made against 
reasonably priced rental alternatives (e.g., Germany); of "market-driven home 
ownership," where access to ownership is achieved mainly through commercial 
channels (e.g, United Kingdom); of the "social model" where the state is 
involved in the provision of home ownership (e.g., Norway); and of the 
"familisitic model," where ownership depends on the intergenerational transfer 
of parental homes (e.g., Italy). Poggio's first category bears a clear 
resemblance to Kemeny's unitary sector, and Poggio places France in this 
category.  The special contribution of Poggio's typology lies in its 
clarification of the different state strategies with respect to facilitating 
home ownership. 
A different sort of literature seeks to explain tenancy patterns and the 
home ownership rate by focusing on aspects of the credit market, often in a 
regression analysis framework (e.g., Chiuri and Jappelli [2000]; Scanlon and 
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Whitehead [2004]).  Here, the main attention is given to issues in the judicial 
enforcement of contracts, the socialization of business risk, and the structure 
of mortgage instruments.  Chiuri and Jappelli (2000) rate 14 OECD countries on 
several of these measures; from their Table 2 it is evident that France is in 
the bottom third of countries in regard to efficiency of the judicial system and 
protections afforded to the mortgage lender (“rule of law”), and in the top 
third in terms of legal expenses of the lender in foreclosure proceedings. 
Scanlon and Whitehead (2004) examine the features of mortgage finance 
markets.  In a comparison of 14 European countries (year 2000 data or 
thereabouts) France ranks second lowest in average loan-to-home value ratio 
(Scanlon and Whitehead 2004, Table 10).  Also, the mortgage repayment period 
tends to be shorter in France than in most European countries, and the 
percentage of home owners holding a mortgage is the second lowest of the ten 
countries for which data were available (Scanlon and Whitehead 2004, Table 15).  
Thus, in France, home purchasers typically must make larger down payments and 
repay the loan in a short period; as a result, fewer mortgages are held. 
 The summary picture from these comments is one of little state support for 
home ownership in France, either in the form of direct financial assistance to 
home buyers or in terms of risk mitigation for mortgage lenders.  There is a 
robust program for the provision of social housing, but these efforts have 
focused on rental units (e.g. the programs of Habitat à Loyers Modérés).  Even 
the limited funds for supporting home ownership have largely been allotted for 
the purchase of newly built structures, rather than more broadly available for 
the acquisition of existing homes (Miron 2001, p. 62).
5
 
Not unexpectedly, given these considerations, the home ownership rate in 
France (56%) in much below the average of the European countries (67%)--Scanlon 
                                                 
5
There is a savings plan in France, intended to encourage home ownership, which 
permits the savings accumulations to be converted into low rate mortgages 
(Epargne-Logement).  However, the mortgage loans in this program are not large 
and the minimum accumulation period is five years (18 months in a second type of 
account), precluding rapid entry into home ownership status.  Complicating 
matters for a potential buyer, mortgages in France tend to be closely tied to 
the credit-worthiness of the borrower, with the loan amount capped so that 
annual payments do not exceed a third of household income (Miron [2001, p. 64]; 
Diamond and Lea [1992, pp. 55, 73; Table 3.3]). 
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and Whitehead (2004, Table 2).  More relevant for our purposes, the ownership 
rate by "young entrant households" is 17% in France, in comparison with an 
average of 48% for the other European countries (Scanlon and Whitehead [2004, 
Table 5]).  While the definition of young entrant household is a bit complex,
6
 
Chiuri and Jappelli (2000, Table 6) report analogous figures for household heads 
aged 25-29: an ownership rate of 20.4% in France which is the second lowest 
among the 12 countries they surveyed.
7
 
In light of these matters we expect parental resources to play a 
considerable role in France in the home acquisition process.  Young couples have 
little in the way of savings and, in the context of an inefficient mortgage 
market and few governmental supports for home ownership, the availability of 
parental aid can be a crucial factor.  As noted, parental transfers can be used 
in several ways to assist with a home purchase; they can permit a reduction in 
the waiting time, facilitate the acquisition of a more costly home, or enable a 
higher downpayment thereby reducing carrying costs of the mortgage.  Thus, to 
obtain a comprehensive picture of the impact of parental assistance on home 
ownership and living standards, we consider the parental effects on all three 
outcomes.  Moreover, we examine both parental resource effects and transfer 
effects.  While parental resources can serve as a proxy for transfers, in that 
parents with greater resources are likely to provide more assistance, the 
realized transfers do not necessarily encapsulate the full impact of parental 
resources.  In particular, children who do not request assistance may 
nonetheless believe that they can overspend from their savings in the knowledge 
that, if required, parental aid will be forthcoming. 
 
 III. THE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY AND ANALYTIC APPROACH 
 
The 1991-92 INSEE Survey of Financial Assets consists of a random sample 
of 9530 French households.  The survey covers asset holdings of the respondent 
and transfer receipts from parents, as well as the usual biographical 
                                                 
6
 Young entrant household is defined in Scanlon and Whitehead (2004, p. 9) as a 
two-adult household without children, with the household head "around 25 years 
of age" and of average income for the age group. 
 
7
 Meron and Courgeau (2004) provide a comprehensive account of the issues facing 
young couples in France with respect to the transition to home ownership status, 
along with annual data on the rate of entry into home ownership. 
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information about the respondent, spouse, and parents.  The strengths of the 
survey, for our purposes, are that the background questions refer to both sets 
of parents of the couple and are sufficiently detailed to permit a crude wealth 
measure to be constructed for each parental household; moreover, the wealth 
questions pertain to when respondent and spouse were teenagers or young adults, 
permitting the parental resources to be associated with the startup expenses of 
a young couple.  The precise questions ask about parental economic circumstance-
-father’s occupation, parental asset holdings, financial difficulties--“when the 
respondent (spouse) was young.”  A disadvantage of the survey is that it is some 
16 years old and does not capture the experiences of very recent entrants into 
the housing market.  But this is offset by the unique coverage of the data--
detailed information on the downpayment proportion, value of the home, and 
living standard of the couple, as well as details on parental wealth and the 
timing of transfers in relation to the purchase decision. 
The survey has some limitations.  It did not inquire about parental 
education, though information was gathered about father’s occupation and this is 
a more proximate determinant of parental income.  More consequential, the survey 
asks about the current residence of the respondent, not the first owned home.  
This is a serious matter since the literature relating home ownership to 
parental resources generally focuses on the first owned residence.  However, in 
countries where entrance into home ownership is much delayed and, consequently, 
where fewer years remain in the life course for residence changes (e.g., Italy), 
there is a tradition of identifying a currently owned residence with the first 
acquired home (e.g., Guiso and Jappelli 1999; Bernardi and Poggio 2004).  While 
such an identification is plausible for France in light of the aforementioned 
low ownership rate by “young entrants,” our analysis does not rely on this 
assumption.  Rather, in the main, we examine parental resource and transfer 
effects on features of the currently owned residence.  Our imagery of the 
transfer effects is one of the accumulation of advantage, with the expectation 
that the financial benefits of parental assistance with a prior residence would 
likely be reflected in the value of the current residence.   
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Several selection decisions were made.  First, the sample was restricted 
to married or cohabitating couples without a prior marriage or children from an 
earlier union, and in which the respondent was less than 65 years old at the 
time of the survey.  The limitation of no prior marriage is intended to reduce 
the complexity of having some couples who have had more than two sets of parents 
from whom transfers might have been received.  The exclusion of respondents with 
children from a prior union removes problems of financial obligations due to an 
earlier cohabitation.  The age restriction limits the sample to respondents who 
reached maturity post World War II.  As a result of these decisions, the sample 
was reduced to 4,471 observations.   
Our analysis is reported in two sections.  In the first we examine 
parental resource effects on the waiting time to home ownership as well as on 
the ownership rate and the value of the home.  The intent of this section is to 
assess the total effects of parental resources on the ownership decision, which 
includes the impact of anticipated transfers as well as realized transfers.  The 
modeling strategy involves a consideration of the effects of the resources of 
husband’s and wife’s parents, followed by the introduction of terms for the 
human capital, income, and savings of the respondent’s family.  The logic of the 
strategy is that we first assess the total effects of parental resources on the 
dependent variables, then tease out the pathways by which the parental assets 
make their contribution--via direct transfers versus investments in education 
and in the earnings capacity of offspring.   
In the second analytic section we restrict attention to homeowners and 
examine the effects of realized parental transfers on several outcome variables: 
the downpayment proportion, home value, and non-housing expenditures following a 
home purchase.  In short, we seek here to understand the impact of transfers on 
the details of the home purchase decision as well as on subsequent living 
standards.  Several methodological issues are taken into account.  First, there 
is the potential endogeneity of transfers.  Respondents who could not afford the 
downpayment might have requested help form parents, which would have been 
reported as a transfer.  In this case, receipt of a transfer would be correlated 
with the error term, violating the regression assumptions.  A second issue 
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concerns the joint determination of downpayment proportion and home value: if 
parents have available a fixed sum to transfer, the allocations for the 
downpayment and for acquiring a more costly residence would be correlated.  This 
possibility is also taken into account in the modeling. 
IV.  PARENTAL RESOURCE EFFECTS 
In this section we examine parental resource effects on the waiting time 
to home ownership and home value.  The parental resources that are considered 
are father’s occupational status (ISEI scores coded from two-digit occupational 
categories [Ganzeboom, et. al. 1992]) which is a proxy for permanent income, and 
parental wealth when the respondent “was young.”  The latter is an index created 
from the sum of three items: ownership of a home, other real estate, and a farm.  
Since working farms typically include a residence, respondents who reported that 
father was a farmer and owned both a farm and a home do not have farm ownership 
added to their sum.  Admittedly, the resulting measure is a crude index of 
parental wealth; as a result, the true wealth effect will probably be 
underestimated.  The parental resource variables also contain a measure of the 
financial well-being of the parental family when the respondent (spouse) was 
young--a dichotomous term, coded one if there were serious financial problems.  
Additionally, to tap demands on the parental resources, we added a term for the 
number of siblings of the respondent (spouse).  
Measures of the couple’s own resources include several human capital 
variables--household income, husband’s and wife’s education--and terms for 
accumulated savings as indexed by husband’s age at marriage and duration of the 
union.  Age at marriage is a proxy for savings prior to the union; individuals 
who are older at marriage have had more years to save.  Similarly, duration of 
the marriage taps accumulations over the course of the union.  Separate terms 
are introduced because the savings rate may differ before and after marriage; 
also, the latter captures the joint accumulations of husband and wife.  Finally, 
we include dummy terms for city size and year of marriage; the first adjusts for 
location differences in the availability of rental housing that are correlated 
with city size, the second for temporal changes in government housing policy and 
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mortgage availability. Descriptive statistics for these variables are reported 
in Table A-1. 
Homeownership.  Because of the limited resources of young couples and an 
inefficient mortgage market in France, the financial savings of parents are 
likely to play a considerable role in facilitating the acquisition of a home.  
As motivation for this investigation we present in Figure 1 survival curves of 
the waiting time from marriage to ownership of the current residence, with non-
owners at the survey date treated as censored observations.  The curves refer to 
different parental wealth levels; the top one shows the trajectory when neither 
set of parents had high wealth, the middle curve indicates the time path when 
one parental set, but not both, had high wealth, and the low curve pertains to 
couples in which both parental sets had high wealth.
8
  The effects of the 
extreme categories are consistent: at all time points the couples with low 
parental wealth are less likely to have made the transition to ownership status. 
The path for respondents with one set of high wealth parents is 
intermediate for much of the time course though it overlaps with the high wealth 
curve at 18 years.  These data, however, refer to the waiting time to a 
currently owned residence, and the likelihood that this residence is not the 
first owned home increases with marriage duration.  Consequently, as a measure 
of the parental wealth effect on the waiting time to first owned home, the 
curves are most reliable for the early decades of marriage.  For this period 
there is an evident tendency for the waiting time to be lessened when parental 
wealth is available, more so when there is wealth in the hands of both parental 
sets.  
                      ________________________ 
Figure 1 about here 
________________________ 
Parental wealth is correlated with other parental characteristics, 
especially income and family size, which can also affect the availability of 
resources for transfer and thereby influence the waiting time.  For this reason 
                                                 
8
High wealth was defined as scores 2 or 3 on the wealth index.  The resulting 
distribution contains 576 cases in which both parental sets had high wealth, 
1,595 observations in which one but not both had high wealth, and 2,801 
instances in which neither had high wealth. 
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we report in column (1) of Table 1 a Cox model of the hazard to ownership, with 
regressors present for several measures of parental resources--father’s 
occupational status, financial problems when respondent (spouse) was young, and 
number of siblings, as well as the wealth index.  To allow for the possibility 
that assistance comes differentially from one side of the family, the resources 
are tabulated separately for each parental set.  Also included, though not 
shown, are controls for city size and year of marriage to net out location and 
cohort effects. 
________________________ 
Table 1 about here 
________________________ 
The results are clear.  Even in the context of terms for father’s 
occupational status (a proxy for permanent income) and financial problems during 
youth, the wealth effects are considerable, of almost equal size for each 
parental set.  Not surprisingly, the variable for number of siblings is negative 
for both parental sets, though significant only in the case of wife’s parents; a 
larger sibship means that less assistance is available to each child.  None of 
the other resource measures achieves significance. 
While these findings are consistent with other studies of the impact of 
parental resources on the waiting time to ownership of a first home (e.g., Kurz 
2004; Mulder and Smits 1999), we hesitate to follow Guiso and Jappelli (1999) or 
Bernardi and Poggio (2004) in associating a currently owned home with the first 
owned residence.  Therefore, instead of further examination of the waiting time, 
we turn to a Probit model with the dichotomous variable, ownership of the 
current residence versus rental tenancy; this formulation does not require an 
identification of a currently owned residence with the first owned home.  
However, our argument about parental effects does assume that if the respondent 
owned a prior residence then the equity in that home, including the contribution 
from parental assistance, has been transferred to the current residence and not 
withdrawn from the housing market.  In short, we presume that a respondent who 
owned previously has not moved into rental housing or traded down to a less 
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expensive home; the latter process is important to our subsequent analysis of 
home value.   
How reasonable are these assumptions?  Trading down by homeowners does 
occur, but it mainly takes place among the elderly who are retired or 
contemplating retirement (Megbolugbe et. al 1997; Myers et. al. 1998).  In 
regard to moves from ownership to rental housing, an examination of cohort data 
suggests that the ownership rate increases with age until the early or mid-60’s 
(Banks and Rohwedder [2003] for the UK; Alessie and Kapteyn [2003] for the 
Netherlands; Borsch-Supan, et. al. [2003] for Germany; the last referencing real 
estate wealth).  Thus, transitions out of home ownership, along with trading 
down, appear to be concentrated in the later stages of the life cycle. 
We lack comparable data for France; however, there is no reason to expect 
a different pattern in that country.  Further, we do have comparative country 
statistics on equity withdrawals from the housing market, a category that 
includes the renegotiation of existing mortgages and the contracting of second 
mortgages, as well as the preceding strategies for extracting housing market 
equity.  These figures show that equity withdrawals in France (and Germany) are 
the lowest of the 10 European and North American countries that were surveyed 
(Catte, et. al. 2004, Figure 5b).  Consequently, we consider the assumptions of 
a low rate of transition out of ownership status and a tendency by homeowners to 
transfer equity from a prior residence to the current one to be reasonable.  It 
is these assumptions that provide the rationale for examining ownership status 
and home value of the current residence in terms of differences in parental 
resources. 
The results from the Probit model, reported in column (2), are consistent 
with our contentions.  The regressors in this equation are the same ones that 
appeared in the Cox model and the qualitative findings are quite similar: strong 
effects for the parental wealth terms but little evidence that other parental 
resources, aside from sibship size, are consequential as determinants of home 
ownership.  We take the similarity in findings between the two models as 
evidence that for the great majority of respondents either the currently owned  
home is the first owned residence or that ownership tenure, once achieved, tends 
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to be maintained, with the equity in an earlier residence transferred to the 
current one. 
What, then, can be said about the pathways by which parental wealth 
contributes to ownership status?  There are two routes of interest.  First, 
parental resources can impact the savings accumulations of offspring through 
parental investments in schooling and earnings, with the cumulated household 
savings then applied to a home purchase.  Second, direct transfers of parental 
wealth could be made available to children, to assist with the acquisition of a 
home. 
These possibilities are explored in model (3), in which variables have 
been added for education of the respondent and spouse, household income, age of 
husband at marriage, marriage duration, and number in the household.  The age 
and duration terms are proxies for household savings--older respondents would 
have had a greater opportunity to accumulate resources before marriage; in the 
same way, the duration variable indexes savings since marriage.  Similarly, 
number in the household taps a possible desire by growing families to settle 
into home ownership and stabilize their housing arrangements.  The empirical 
results provide strong evidence for the respondent’s resource effects.  The 
income variable and the proxies for household savings are all significant and 
have the expected signs.  The term for marriage duration squared is negative, 
suggesting diminishing returns with savings growth; presumably, after a certain 
level of wealth accumulation the decision to become a homeowner is a lifestyle 
choice, not constrained by insufficient savings.  The turning point, however, 
occurs at some 41 years of marriage, so the savings effect is positive over 
pretty much the full marital course.   
Of particular relevance to understanding the transmission pathways concern 
the effects of the parental wealth terms.  Even in the presence of the several 
measures of the respondent’s savings and income, the wealth terms remain highly 
significant, reduced only modestly in size--husband’s parental wealth remains at 
87% of its prior value; wife’s parental wealth is 76% of its previous magnitude.  
Thus, while the resources of the respondent are hardly irrelevant to ownership 
prospects, the residual wealth effects suggest that direct financial assistance 
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to children, rather than parental investments in human capital, is the dominant 
route by which parental wealth conditions housing tenure status. 
Home value.  If parental wealth influences the likelihood of ownership, 
what impact does it have on home value?  This issue is addressed in Table 2 
where the dependent variable refers to the value of the current home, as 
estimated by the respondent at the time of the survey.  Because home value is a 
limited dependent variable--continuous for homeowners but zero for renters--we 
use a Tobit regression model.  Also, to reduce skewness from a few large home 
values, we log this variable.  Column (1) reports the total contributions of the 
parental resource terms, with controls present only for city size and marriage 
year.  The results show that both father’s occupational status and parental 
wealth have sizable impacts and that sibship size is negative, though 
significant only for wife’s parental family.  Not surprisingly, these effects 
indicate that home value is greater when the respondent and spouse come from 
families that have more wealth and income, the latter proxied by occupational 
status. 
________________________ 
Table 2 about here 
________________________ 
In column (2) we have added terms for respondent’s economic status.  These 
variables have effects similar to their contributions in the determination of 
homeownership: home value is greater when respondent and wife have higher 
household income and savings, the latter proxied by marriage duration and by age 
of husband at marriage.  In the presence of these terms only the parental wealth 
variables remain significant.  Again, the wealth terms are not much reduced--
husband’s father’s wealth is 72% of its prior value, wife’s father’s wealth is 
73% of its former magnitude.  These findings suggest that while parental 
occupational status (and earnings, by implication) affect home value through 
their impact on the incomes of offspring, parental wealth conditions home 
ownership through a different path, by facilitating direct financial transfers 
across the generations.   
V. PARENTAL TRANSFER EFFECTS 
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 Having established that parental wealth has strong effects on the 
ownership rate of offspring and on home value, and that direct transfers are the 
principal route by which parental wealth exerts its impact, we turn to the ways 
by which the receipt of transfers, per se, influences the details of the home 
purchase decision.  Specifically, we examine the consequences of parental 
transfers for the downpayment proportion, home value, and non-housing 
consumption, the latter viewed as a measure of living standards. 
 Whereas the previous analysis relied on the residual effects of parental 
wealth net of investments in the earning capacity of offspring to infer the role 
of parental transfers in the home acquisition process, we now examine the 
transfer effects directly.  The transfers we assess include intervivos gifts and 
bequests, whether or not designated by parents as assistance intended for the 
purchase of a home.   
 The 1992 Actifs Financiers Survey contains information on both formal 
gifts signed before a notary and informal ones which are usually of smaller 
amounts.  The gifts could have been money, land, or other valuables.  We have 
detailed information for up to two gifts received by a respondent, with similar 
information for the spouse.  For each gift we know the date and amount; also, 
when the transfer consisted of real property we have its value as estimated by 
the respondent.  Two variables were created from this information--a dummy term 
for gift receipt, which takes the value one if assistance was received by 
respondent or spouse, and a term for gift value which is the sum of the 
individual gift amounts.  Analogous information was collected for bequests, with 
comparable variables constructed.  Since some transfers were received several 
years before a home purchase, all transfer amounts are capitalized at a 2% per 
year rate of return from the receipt date to the time of the purchase.  
Descriptive statistics for the variables used in this section of the paper are 
reported in Table A-2. 
A) Downpayment Proportion   
One use of the transfer monies would be to increase the downpayment.  A 
large downpayment means a lower monthly carrying cost; moreover, the mortgage 
interest rate itself might be reduced since the lender would be assuming less 
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risk.  In the INSEE survey, homeowners were asked about the downpayment 
proportion of the "most important home" they have purchased.  In most cases, for 
reasons we have noted, the current dwelling is the only home that has been 
owned.  However, in cases where a prior home was owned, the most significant 
residence might refer to that home. 
We restrict attention in this analysis to the subsample of respondents who 
have ever purchased a home.  An alternate approach would have been to retain 
renters in the sample and use a Heckman-type selection model (Kennedy 1998, p. 
256), but we did not have a variable in the INSEE data set that could 
convincingly be used to identify the selection equation, namely a variable that 
affects the decision to acquire a home but does not have an impact on the 
downpayment proportion.  
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the downpayment for several categories 
of gift/bequest amounts received before the home purchase.  The entries make 
clear the close association between the downpayment proportion and the monetary 
value of a gift or bequest.  At the low end of the distribution--downpayment 
below 10%--households that did not receive a transfer predominate, and there is 
a clear downward progression in the representation rate of households as the 
transfer amount is increased.  At the upper end--downpayment of more than 50%--
the findings are reversed: here there is a concentration of households that have 
received the largest transfers and an almost uniform increase in the 
representation rate with transfer amount.  
_____________________________ 
Figure 2 about here 
_____________________________ 
 We next use a multivariate formulation to explore the impact of parental 
transfers on the downpayment proportion.  Since the dependent variable is 
ordinal with six categories (downpayment= 0%, less than 10%, 10-30%, 31-50%, 51-
99%, 100%), we estimate an ordered Probit model, 
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where Y
i
* 
is a latent variable, 
i 
follows a normal distribution, X
i
 is a vector of 
covariates, and the cut points, 
1  
through
 k-1
,
 
are estimated from the data.  The 
observations in this analysis are the 3,271 respondents who purchased a home 
since marriage. 
 In Column (1) of Table 3 we report the effects of a gift or bequest 
receipt.  Since the decision to acquire a residence might have been made in 
anticipation of a transfer, we have added dummy terms for gifts or bequests 
received subsequent to the purchase, as well as receipts prior to the purchase.  
We also include proxies for the savings and income of the household; thus, the 
parental transfer terms represent direct effects, net of a respondent’s own 
resources.
9
  Husband’s age, marriage duration in the purchase year, and number 
of persons in the dwelling serve as indicators of household savings; the last is 
a measure of demands upon the respondent’s resources.  Household income, in this 
analysis, is proxied by education and occupational status.  Although income data 
are available in the INSEE survey they pertain to the survey year, while the 
purchase might have taken place decades earlier.  For this reason, education and 
occupational status—-relatively stable measures of permanent income--are 
utilized as indicators of household income at the time of the purchase.  
_____________________________ 
Table 3 about here 
_____________________________ 
 The terms for respondent’s resources are all significant in the 
regression.  Husband’s occupational status, education, and the proxies for 
household savings predict to a higher downpayment, while household size is 
inversely related to the downpayment proportion.  Clearly, the ongoing costs of 
raising a large family mean fewer resources available for reducing the 
downpayment.  In regard to the parental transfer terms, the receipt of gifts or 
bequests before a purchase increases the downpayment proportion, while transfers 
after the purchase date have no apparent effect.  Thus, we fail to find evidence 
                                                 
9
Also included in the regressions are controls for city size and year of the 
home purchase.  The latter serves as a control for temporal variations in 
government policy that have affected access to credit.   
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that, in making a decision about the downpayment, couples take into account the 
likelihood of a transfer receipt in the years subsequent to the home purchase. 
 A similar analysis was carried out with measures of the value of a gift or 
bequest, and the results, reported in column (2) reinforce the preceding 
account.  The larger the gift or bequest received before a home purchase, the 
greater the downpayment.  Thus, from these analyses of incidence and amount, we 
conclude that one mechanism by which parental transfers advantage offspring in 
the home acquisition process is to permit a higher downpayment, offsetting the 
monthly carrying costs of a mortgage.  There is no evidence, however, that 
households take into account in their purchase planning the receipt of future 
transfers.  
Endogeneity issues.  There is a potential bias in the preceding account in 
that the parental transfers may be endogenous.  This would occur, for example, 
if couples that cannot afford the downpayment turn to their parents for 
assistance.  Conversely, it could be the case that parents are more likely to 
transfer funds to children who have chosen to make a large downpayment.  In 
either case, receipt of a transfer would be correlated with the error term, 
violating the regression assumptions. 
To address this issue we instrument the transfer variables on parental 
wealth.  To secure identification we presume--not unreasonably--that transfers 
are the principal, if not the sole, channel by which parental wealth affects the 
downpayment proportion.  A Probit model is used in the first stage regression 
when transfer incidence is addressed; a Tobit model is employed when transfer 
value is considered.   
 The second stage results are reported in Table 4.  The models here are 
slightly different from those in Table 3 as it was necessary to combine gift and 
bequest receipts before a home purchase and delete the (non-significant) terms 
for transfer receipt after a purchase in order to have only one endogenous 
regressor in an equation.  Otherwise, it would not have been possible to 
identify the multiple transfer terms.  We present estimates from both the 
exogenous formulations of the transfer terms in columns (1) and (3) (which show 
the Table 3 results in condensed form) and the instrumented formulations in 
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columns (2) and (4).  In each case the instrumented values are higher, 
suggesting that the estimates from the exogenous model are downwardly biased and 
that the “true” contributions of parental transfers are somewhat greater.   
_____________________________ 
Table 4 about here 
_____________________________ 
B) Home Value  
 In addition to permitting a larger downpayment, parental transfers could 
be used to acquire a more expensive home.  This possibility is explored in Table 
5 using log(home value) as the dependent variable.  We restrict the sample to 
homeowners because our key explanatory variables (transfer receipt before a home 
purchase; transfer receipt after a home purchase) are not defined for renters, 
and we use OLS regression.  Further, because some of the models in this section 
require downpayment and home value information for the same residence, we take 
as observations only respondents who were home owners at the time of the survey 
and for whom we have matching downpayment data.  The resulting sample contains 
2,452 observations.    
_____________________________ 
Table 5 about here 
_____________________________ 
 The explanatory variables are the ones described in reference to Table 3, 
except that household income is included as a regressor since both it and home 
value refer to the survey year.  For the same reason, the marriage duration and 
age variables are computed at the survey year, not the home purchase year.  
Thus, we seek to examine the impact of parental transfers on current home value, 
net of the measures of respondent’s household resources. 
 Several of the measures of respondent’s resources are significant in 
column (1) which examines the impact of transfer incidence, and in column (2) 
which probes the contribution of transfer amount.  Clearly, families that have 
higher incomes and greater savings (as indexed by marriage duration) tend to 
purchase more costly dwellings.  Marriage, in contrast with cohabitation, is 
also associated with greater home value.  Household size, however, has no 
effect.  Whereas large families make a smaller downpayment (Table 3), suggesting 
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financial constraints, there is no evidence of a similar impact on home value.  
Since the size of a residence is correlated with its value, large families might 
prefer to not reduce this home feature in their search for an appropriate 
dwelling.   
 The transfer terms reported in Table 5 indicate that, net of a 
respondent’s own resources, households that have received gifts (though not 
bequests) before the purchase tend to own more costly homes.  This is the case 
with respect to both transfer incidence and transfer amount.  Again, consistent 
with the findings in Table 3 for downpayment proportion, the receipt of a 
transfer after the home purchase has no impact on home value.  Clearly, the 
evidence for anticipation of a transfer affecting the expenditure decision is 
lacking. 
 Joint estimation model.  Our findings to this point provide strong 
evidence that parental transfers influence both the downpayment proportion and 
the value of the acquired residence.  But one issue of model specification 
remains to be explored.  It may be the case that, reflecting their resources, 
parents make available a fixed sum for transfer and that the respondent then 
decides how much to apply to the downpayment and how much to the acquisition of 
a larger or an upscale residence.  This imagery suggests that the two outcomes 
are jointly determined, in which case they should be modeled with a formulation 
that takes this fact into account.   
 The specific problem posed by jointly determined dependent variables is 
one of correlated errors.  Separate estimation of each equation ignores the 
correlation and is inefficient.  We address this issue with a joint model in 
which the downpayment proportion is estimated with an ordered Probit and home 
value with an OLS regression.
10
  Joint estimation of the equations was carried 
out using a maximum likelihood algorithm with numerical integration of the 
residuals from the statistical package aML (Lillard and Panis 2003).  In order 
to achieve convergence the transfer variable combines gift and bequest amounts 
                                                 
The joint model is similar to a SUR (Seemingly Unrelated Regression) 
formulation in the case of linear equations (Greene 1990, pp. 509-12).  In our 
specification one of the equations is nonlinear, an ordered Probit. 
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received before the home purchase in place of a separate consideration of the 
two transfer components.   
 Our findings are reported in Table 6.  In the first two columns we present 
results for the downpayment proportion and for home value in which the equations 
were estimated separately.  These are our baseline calculations from the 
condensed specification of the contributions of parental transfers to the two 
outcome variables.  Column (3) reports the corresponding estimates from the 
joint model.  While the results are not strikingly different, the estimates of 
the transfer terms tend to be higher; in both the downpayment equation and in 
the home value equation the increase is some 14%.  Moreover, the correlation 
between the residuals (0.616) is significant, suggesting that unobserved factors 
have a similar influence on both outcomes.  For example, parents who are greatly 
concerned about the financial welfare of their children might provide greater 
assistance for both a larger downpayment and a more expensive home.  
_____________________________ 
Table 6 about here 
_____________________________ 
 Finally, what can be said about the quantitative effects of the parental 
transfers?  By how much is the downpayment increased and by how much is the 
value of the home raised?  Our data do not permit these issues to be addressed 
in terms of purchase price, only with respect to the value of the home at the 
survey date.  Also, since the downpayment proportion is reported in six 
categories (see Figure 2), it must be transformed into a continuous distribution 
in order to estimate the change in proportion.  We did so using an approach that 
is similar to the method of simulated residuals described in Gourieroux et. al. 
(1987). 
 The downpayment category midpoints provide a first approximation to a 
continuous distribution.  The resulting measure, however, has its mass 
concentrated at six points and is not suitable as a dependent variable in a 
regression.  Therefore, for each respondent we drew a random value from the 
uniform distribution, 
  f(x)  =  1/(b - a),   for a<x<b,                        (3) 
 24
where [a,b] corresponds to the respondent's downpayment interval.  This 
distribution has a mean equal to (a+b)/2, which is, in fact, the midpoint of the 
category.  The downpayment value assigned to a respondent is then the random 
draw that lies within his or her interval. 
 With this assignment, model (3) of Table 6 was reestimated, leading to the 
following assessment: For each 10,000 francs received from parents before the 
purchase,
11
 home value (in 1992) was greater by 4,327 francs and the downpayment 
was increased by 0.72 percent.  In terms of average home value in 1992, the 
latter amounts to an extra 1,293 francs in home equity.  Admittedly, these are 
very rough estimates but they provide some sense of the contribution of a 
parental transfer to home equity.  
C) Non-housing consumption 
 The parental transmissions that are intended to assist with the purchase 
of a home can have externalities that spill over to other aspects of living 
standards.   Whether a transfer is used to increase the downpayment proportion 
or to offset the withdrawal from household savings in order to finance the 
purchase, there will be a lessening of the draw from a respondent’s own 
resources to meet the ongoing mortgage costs and other expenses associated with 
home maintenance.  The INSEE survey does not permit us to go into detail on 
these consequences of the parental transfers, but there is one item that 
provides a summary measure of the impact of the transfers on living standards. 
The survey asks whether a respondent’s household has reduced its non-
housing consumption expenditures as a result of the home purchase, and we have 
tabulated the responses in terms of the gift/bequest amount received before the 
home purchase.  The results, reported in Figure 3, provide evidence for the 
spill over of the parental transfers into other living standard domains.  In 
particular, the response, “yes, we have reduced non-housing consumption” shows a 
consistent (though modest) decline with generosity of the transfer, and the 
response “no, we did not reduce consumption” shows an evident increase with 
                                                 
11
To put this sum into perspective, the average gift before purchase was some 
81,000 francs and the average bequest was 86,000 francs (see Table A-2).  To 
translate these amounts into dollars, during the period 1970-1990 the franc 
varied from 4/dollar to 10/dollar.  Thus, at a value of 6/dollar, a 10,000 franc 
transfer amounted to $1,667. 
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transfer amount.  Indeed, some 49% of respondents who received a large gift or 
bequest before the purchase reported no reduction in consumption, in contrast 
with 35% who received no transfer.  In short, there is clear evidence of a 
diffuse effect of the transfers on living standards, extending beyond their 
direct contribution to the home purchase decision. 
_____________________________ 
Figure 3 about here 
_____________________________ 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 While a number of studies have documented the impact of parental resources 
on home ownership, along with the effects of parental transfers on aspects of 
the ownership decision, the contribution of the present undertaking has been to 
investigate the linkages among these several factors.  Specifically, using a 
unique data set from France, we have examined how parental resources, especially 
the wealth component, and parental transfers influence the details of the home 
acquisition process--the likelihood of ownership, the downpayment proportion, 
and home value--as well as the contribution of the parental assistance to a 
broad measure of living standards. 
 The results provide a consistent picture of the importance of parental 
wealth for the several outcome variables.  Our index of parental wealth makes a 
significant contribution to the homeownership rate and to home value, effects 
that remain large even in the presence of controls for respondent’s earnings and 
accumulated savings.  This suggests that the mechanism through which parental 
wealth operates is one of direct transfers, rather than investments in the human 
capital of children.  An examination of the details of the transfer process 
reveals that the parental assistance is used to both increase the downpayment 
proportion and raise the value of the acquired residence.  Moreover, these 
effects are robust to modifications in the specification of the transfer 
process. 
 Yet, while this paper is nominally about the operation of the housing 
market, the deeper issues that motivated the study concern the role of parental 
wealth and financial transfers in the transmission of advantage across 
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generations.  We have focused on the housing market because for the majority of 
families in the US, as well as in France, home ownership is the asset of 
greatest value in their wealth portfolio.  Further, the assistance provided by 
parents for a home purchase tends to involve sums that are considerable and 
thereby constitutes a major avenue in the transmission of material resources 
across generations.  This is true for the US (Engelhardt and Mayer 1994; 1998; 
Boehm and Schlottmann 2002) as well as for France. 
 Parental wealth and intervivos transfers are understudied topics in 
stratification research, though see the recent important contributions by Conley 
(1999); Keister (2000; 2005), Wolff (2006), and Davies (2008).  This oversight 
requires remedy because household wealth is a major item in the parental 
resource base, and because it is used by parents expediently to advantage the 
attainments and living standards of offspring.  Also, since parental wealth is 
positively correlated with parental education and occupational status--the 
parental resources commonly studied--omission of the wealth variable means that 
the effects of the remaining terms may be biased upwards.   
 With respect to the imagery of the transmission process, the absence of a 
measure of parental wealth effectively removes "agency" from the parental 
domain--the use of transfers by parents to achieve particular goals, either for 
themselves or the child.  Without a consideration of parental wealth and 
financial transfers, we cannot address parental decision making concerning when 
to transmit, how much to transfer, for what purposes and to which child, a motif 
that is critical to understanding the ways that parents contribute to the life 
chances and well-being of their offspring. 
 With the accelerating privatization of essential social services in recent 
decades, household wealth has become a critical resource, as families 
increasingly must self-insure against the risk of misfortune.  This trend has 
amplified the importance of intergenerational financial linkages, as well.  
Young couples have a great many material needs associated with the start of a 
new family, while their incomes, relative to median household income, have been 
declining over the past 30 years (Mishel, et. al. 2009, pp. 55-56); this makes 
 27
for a precarious financial situation and a heightened dependence on parental 
resources and parental assistance. 
 As a final matter, writing in mid-2009 one can hardly ignore the recent 
collapse in home prices.  How might this economic downturn impact the role of 
homeownership as a vehicle in the buildup of household wealth through the 
accumulation of home equity?  The downturn in home prices was abrupt and 
substantial--between 2006 and 2009 the Case-Schiller 20 city composite index of 
home prices fell by 30% (Marketwatch 2009).  However, this decline has brought 
prices back only to 2003 levels, and families that purchased as recently as the 
year 2000 are still ahead, on average, by some 28%, as well as having enjoyed 
the tax benefits associated with homeownership.   
 While buyers of homes in very recent years have been severely harmed by 
the price decline--and this has disproportionately impacted young couples--the 
acquisition of a residence is a long term investment and, going forward, it is 
not clear that this will fail to be a sound investment.  Indeed, in the 
immediate future, following the steep price decline, a home purchase might be a 
wise move by a young couple.  Yet, what is fairly certain to ensue in the wake 
of the steep price decline is that mortgage lenders will be more circumspect 
about the credit worthiness of new home buyers and will require a larger 
downpayment from them to reduce the risk of default.  This, in turn, will mean 
an even greater reliance on parental assistance in order to purchase a 
residence. 
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Figure 1. Transition to Home Ownership, by Parental Wealth Category
1
 
 
 
 
   Source: Survey Actifs Financiers 1992. 
  1. Curves depict survival in the state of non-ownership.  N(no parents) = 2,801; N(one parental  
  set) = 1,595; N(two parental sets) = 576. 
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Figure 2. The Effect of Transfer Amount Received Before Home Purchase 
on Down Payment Proportion 
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   Source: Survey Actifs Financiers 1992. N = 3,271. 
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Figure 3.  Reduction in Non-Housing Consumption Following the Home Purchase,  
by Transfer Amount1 
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1.
 
Response to question: Has your household reduced its non-housing consumption 
   expenditures  because of the home purchase?  N = 3271. 
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Table 1.  Parental Resource Effects on Hazard of Homeownership and  
Home Ownership Rate
1 
 
 
Variables
2
 (1)  Cox  Model (2) Probit Model (3) Probit Model 
 coef t-value  coef t-value coef t-value 
       
Constant     1.058** (9.72)  -7.241** (11.69) 
Husband’s parents:       
   Father’s occupational status
3
  0.038 (0.31)   0.294 (1.95)  -0.120 (0.74) 
   Financial problems in youth -0.058 (1.33)  -0.061 (1.17)  -0.057 (1.07) 
   Number of siblings of husband -0.008 (0.99)  -0.008 (0.91)   0.001 (0.10) 
   Parental weath
4
  0.096** (5.08)   0.070** (3.03)   0.061* (2.53) 
Wife’s parents:       
   Father’s occupational status
3
  0.078 (0.62)   0.195 (1.30)  -0.184 (1.14) 
   Financial problems in youth -0.029 (0.63)  -0.038 (0.72)  -0.018 (0.32) 
   Number of siblings of wife -0.022** (2.75)  -0.020* (2.23)  -0.012 (1.28) 
   Parental weath
4
  0.107** (5.53)   0.097** (4.02)   0.074** (2.96) 
Respondent’s characteristics:       
  Age of husband at marriage/cohabitation       0.011 (1.95) 
  Duration of the union       0.109** (5.32) 
  Duration squared (/100)      -0.132** (2.88) 
  Married vs. cohabitating       0.454** (4.94) 
  Number in household       0.018 (0.87) 
  Husband’s education       0.007 (1.22) 
  Wife’s education       0.007 (1.08) 
  Household income (log)       0.471** (10.50) 
Log likelihood -23312.2 -2277.1 -2151.1 
N 4471 4471 4471 
 
Source: Survey Actifs Financiers 1992 
 
1
Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. The sample is restricted to respondents who were 
less than  
age 65 at the time of the survey. Parental terms refer to period when respondent (spouse) “was young”. 
 
2
Also included in the analysis are terms for city size and year of marriage. 
 
3
Occupational status coded by ISEI scores, divided by 100 (Ganzeboom, et. al. 1992). 
 
4
Four category scale.  See text for details.
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Table 2.  Parental Resource Effects on Home Value, Tobit estimates
1 
 
 
Variables
2
 (1) (2) 
 Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
     
Constant 10.379** (17.77) -37.639** (12.04) 
Husband’s parents:     
  Father’s occupational status
3 
 2.056* (2.48)  -0.580 (0.69) 
  Financial problems in youth -0.271 (0.95)  -0.220 (0.80) 
  Number of siblings of husband -0.057 (1.12)   0.003 (0.07) 
  Parental weath
4
  0.339** (2.71)   0.245* (2.02) 
Wife’s parents:     
  Father’s occupational status
3
  1.845* (2.22)  -0.437 (0.52) 
  Financial problems in youth -0.204 (0.69)  -0.101 (0.35) 
  Number of siblings of wife -0.127* (2.50)  -0.074 (1.48) 
  Parental weath
4
  0.496** (3.85)   0.363** (2.91) 
Respondent’s characteristics:     
  Age of husband at marriage/cohabitation     0.071* (2.35) 
  Duration of the union     0.711** (6.51) 
  Duration squared (/100)    -0.994** (4.23) 
  Married vs. cohabitating     3.740** (6.83) 
  Number in household     0.127 (1.17) 
  Husband’s education     0.054 (1.70) 
  Wife’s education     0.053 (1.61) 
  Household income (log)     2.593** (11.48) 
Log likelihood -11932.9 -11765.6 
N 4471 4471 
 
 
Source: Survey Actifs Financiers 1992 
 
1
Dependent variable is log(home value).  Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses.  The 
sample is restricted to respondents who were less than age 65 at the time of the survey.  
Parental terms refer to period when respondent (spouse) “was young”. 
 
2
Also included in the analysis are terms for city size and year of marriage. 
 
3
Occupational status coded by ISEI scores, divided by 100 (Ganzeboom, et. al. 1992). 
 
4
Four category scale.  See text for details. 
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Table 3.  The Impact of Parental Transfers on Downpayment Proportion, 
Ordered Probit model
1 
 
 
* p<.05,  **p<.01 
 
Source: Survey Actifs Financiers 1992. 
 
1
Ordered Probit model for down payment proportion with six categories.  Absolute values of t-
statistics are in parentheses.  Dependent variable is log(home value).  Terms for city size and 
year of home purchase were also included in the regression.  Cut point parameters not shown.  
Sample is restricted to respondents who were living together at the time of the purchase and were 
less than 65 years old in the year of the survey.  
 
2
Also included in the analysis are terms for city size and year of home purchase. 
 
3
Occupational status coded by ISEI scores (Ganzeboom, et. al. 1992). 
 
Variables
2
 (1) (2) 
 Coef t-value  coef t-value 
Characteristics of respondent:     
   Age of husband at marriage/cohabitation  0.047** (8.82)  0.047** (8.79) 
   Duration of union at home purchase  0.018* (2.27)  0.018* (2.23) 
   Duration squared (/100)  0.097** (3.67)  0.097** (3.67) 
   Married vs. cohabiting -0.080 (0.67) -0.079 (0.66) 
   Number in household -0.126** (7.48) -0.126** (7.49) 
   Husband’s education  0.020** (3.70)  0.020** (3.65) 
   Wife’s education  0.017** (3.29)  0.017** (3.29) 
   Husband’s occupational status
3 
(/100)  0.386** (2.67)  0.386** (2.67) 
     
Transfers received:     
   Gift before home purchase  0.153* (2.32)   
   Bequest before home purchase  0.140* (2.27)   
   Gift after home purchase  0.091 (1.55)   
   Bequest after home purchase -0.083 (1.61)   
     
   Gift value before home purchase (log/100)    1.325* (2.30) 
   Bequest value before home purchase (log/100)    1.224* (2.28) 
   Gift value after home purchase (log/100)    0.823 (1.63) 
   Bequest value after home purchase (log/100)   -0.646 (1.46) 
Log likelihood -4982.4 -4982.1 
N 3271 3271 
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Table 4.  Estimates of the Parental Transfer Effect on Downpayment Proportion 
with Correction for Endogeneity Bias, Ordered Probit model
1 
 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 coef t-value coef t-value coef t-value coef t-value 
Characteristics of Respondent:         
   Age of husband at marriage/cohab.  0.047** (8.79)  0.046** (8.68)  0.047** (8.76)  0.046** (8.67) 
   Duration of union at home purchase  0.017* (2.11)  0.015 (1.89)  0.017* (2.09)  0.015 (1.89) 
   Duration squared (/100)  0.099** (3.75)  0.107** (4.07)  0.098** (3.73)  0.107** (4.07) 
   Married vs. cohabitating  -0.067 (0.56) -0.070 (0.58) -0.068 (0.56) -0.069 (0.58) 
   Number in household -0.124** (7.37) -0.122** (7.27) -0.124** (7.38) -0.122** (7.27) 
   Husband’s education  0.020** (3.77)  0.020** (3.76)  0.020** (3.72)  0.020** (3.63) 
   Wife’s education  0.018** (3.53)  0.016** (3.06)  0.018** (3.51)  0.016** (3.04) 
   Husband’s occupational status
3
(/100)  0.355* (2.46)  0.403** (2.78)  0.356* (2.46)  0.390** (2.69) 
         
Gift or bequest received before  
home purchase:
2
 
        
   Incidence:  Observed  0.184** (4.36)       
               Instrumented    0.321** (4.95)     
   Value(log/100):  Observed      1.644** (4.52)   
                    Instrumented        2.478** (5.01) 
Log likelihood -4986.9 -4984.1 -4986.2 -4983.8 
N 3271 3271 3271 3271 
 
* p<.05,  **p<.01 
 
Source: Survey Actifs Financiers 1992. 
 
 
1
Ordered Probit model for down payment proportion with six categories.  Absolute values of t-statistics 
are in parentheses.  Also included in model are terms for city size and year of home purchase.  Cut point 
parameters not shown. The sample is restricted to respondents who were living together at the time of home 
purchase and were less than age 65 at the time of the survey.   
 
2
The parental transfer variable is treated as exogenous in models (1) and (3).  Instrumentation is from a 
Probit equation for incidence of transfer receipt in model (2), and from a Tobit model for the log value 
of transfer amount in model(4). Covariates in the instrumentation equations are father’s occupational 
status, financial hardship in youth, parental wealth (these three variables respectively for husband’s and 
wife’s parents), and the variables in the second stage model.  
 
3
Occupational status coded by ISEI scores (Ganzeboom, et. al. 1992). 
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Table 5.  The Impact of Parental Transfers on Home Value, OLS Estimates
1 
 
 
Variables
2
 (1) (2) 
 coef t-value coef t-value 
     
Constant   9.604** (36.04)    9.612** (36.09) 
Characteristics of respondent:     
   Age of husband at marriage/cohab.(/100)  -0.079 (0.31)   -0.096 (0.38) 
   Duration of the union   0.030** (3.34)    0.029** (3.33) 
   Duration squared (/100)  -0.068** (3.54)   -0.068** (3.54) 
   Married vs. cohabitating   0.175** (3.06)    0.175** (3.07) 
   Number in household (/100)   0.428 (0.52)    0.416 (0.50) 
   Husband’s education (/10)   0.149** (6.31)    0.147** (6.26) 
   Wife’s education (/10)   0.075** (3.11)    0.075** (3.10) 
   Household income (log)   0.296** (15.56)    0.295** (15.55) 
     
Transfers received:     
   Gift before home purchase   0.105** (3.24)   
   Bequest before home purchase   0.023 (0.77)   
   Gift after home purchase  -0.022 (0.77)   
   Bequest after home purchase   0.036 (1.39)   
     
   Gift value before home purchase (log/100)      0.938** (3.34) 
   Bequest value before home purchase (log/100)      0.232 (0.91) 
   Gift value after home purchase (log/100)     -0.152 (0.63) 
   Bequest value after home purchase (log/100)      0.369 (1.68) 
R² 0.35 0.35 
N 2452 2452 
 
* p<.05,  **p<.01 
 
Source: Survey Actifs Financiers 1992. 
 
1
Home value (log) at time of the survey.  Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses.  The 
sample is restricted to respondents who were living together at the time of home purchase and were 
less than age 65 at the time of the survey.  
 
2
Terms for city size and year of marriage are included in the regressions.  
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Table 6.  Impact of Parental Transfers on Down Payment Proportion 
and Home Value, Joint Estimation Model
1 
 
 
Variables
2
 (1) 
Downpayment 
(2) 
Home Value 
(3) 
Downpayment & home value 
 coef t-value coef t-value Coef t-value coef t-value 
         
Constant    9.611** (38.01)    9.787** (27.38) 
Age of husband at marriage/cohab.  0.055** (8.92) -0.001 (0.29)  0.060** (8.28)  0.001 (0.22) 
Duration of union at home purchase  0.019** (2.07)    0.017* (1.69)   
Duration squared (/100)  0.106** (3.50)    0.123** (3.75)   
Duration of union at current time    0.030** (3.19)    0.029** (2.37) 
Duration squared (/100)   -0.067** (3.69)   -0.070** (3.01) 
Married vs. cohabitating -0.088 (0.61)  0.175** (2.69) -0.105 (0.60)  0.146 (1.53) 
Number in household -0.140** (7.81)  0.004 (0.57) -0.155** (7.55) -0.001 (0.06) 
Husband’s education  0.023** (3.86)  0.015** (5.99)  0.028** (4.19)  0.016** (4.33) 
Wife’s education  0.023** (3.93)  0.007** (3.07)  0.026** (3.92)  0.009** (2.37) 
Husband’s occupational status
2
 (/100)  0.493** (2.94)    0.382** (2.10)   
Household income (log)    0.294** (16.97)    0.277** (11.28) 
         
Gift or bequest amount received 
    before home purchase (log/100) 
 2.045** (4.67)  0.683** (3.73)  2.339** (4.69)  0.780** (2.93) 
         
Correlation between residuals (t-value)   0.616**  (17.17) 
Log likelihood – R² -3542.37 -1383.71 -5102.51 
N 2452 2452 2452 
 
    * p<.05,  **p<.01  
 
    Source: Survey Actifs Financiers 1992. 
 
1
Equation (1) is an Ordered Probit model for the down payment proportion with 6 categories.  
Equation (2) is an OLS regression for the housing value (in log), and (3) is a joint estimation 
by maximum likelihood of the Ordered Probit and OLS equations.  The equations for downpayment 
proportion also include dummies for city size and year of home purchase; the equations for home 
value include dummies for city size and year of marriage.  Absolute values of t-statistics are in 
parentheses.  
 
2
Occupational status coded by ISEI scores (Ganzeboom et. al. 1992). 
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Table A-1. Descriptive statistics for the full sample 
 
 
Variables Renters Homeowners Total 
Husband’s parents:    
   Father’s occupational status 0.392 0.368 0.375 
   Financial problems in youth 0.268 0.262 0.264 
   Number of siblings of husband 3.007 2.950 2.968 
   Parental weath 0.914 1.040 1.001 
Wife’s parents:    
   Father’s occupational status
3
 0.393 0.370 0.377 
   Financial problems in youth 0.242 0.230 0.234 
   Number of siblings of wife 3.034 2.947 2.974 
   Parental weath
4
 0.834 0.998 0.948 
Respondent’s characteristics:    
  Age of husband at marriage/cohabitation 25.034 24.616 24.744 
  Duration of the union 13.446 20.651 18.453 
  Married vs. cohabitating 0.805 0.970 0.920 
  Number in household 3.441 3.654 3.589 
  Husband’s education 8.400 8.595 8.535 
  Wife’s education 8.104 8.105 8.105 
  Household income (log) 11.782 12.030 11.955 
Transfers received since marriage/cohab.    
   Incidence of receipt of a gift/bequest 0.206 0.527 0.429 
   Value of the gift/bequest (log) 2.119 5.241 4.289 
Number of observations 1364 3107 4471 
 
    Source: Survey Actifs Financiers 1992. 
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Table A-2. Descriptive statistics for the homeowners’ sample 
 
 
 
Variables No receipt 
of gift or 
bequest 
before home 
purchase 
(OK) 
Receipt of  
gift and/or 
bequest 
before home 
purchase 
(OK) 
Total 
homeowners 
Characteristics of respondent:    
   Age of husband at marriage/cohab. 24.167 25.016 24.387 
   Duration of the union 19.058 21.353 19.654 
   Married vs. cohabitating 0.971 0.984 0.974 
   Number in household 3.813 3.633 3.766 
   Husband’s education 8.785 8.958 8.830 
   Wife’s education 8.210 8.549 8.299 
   Husband’s occupational status 48.048 48.248 48.100 
   Household income (log) 12.072 12.086 12.075 
   Home value (francs)
1
 701,628 782,323 722,592 
Transfers received (Incidence):    
   Gift--before home purchase 0.000 0.593 0.154 
   Bequest--before home purchase 0.000 0.499 0.130 
   Gift--after home purchase 0.109 0.535 0.219 
   Bequest--after home purchase 0.147 0.449 0.226 
Transfers received (francs):    
   Gift--before home purchase 0.000 81,294 21,119 
   Bequest--before home purchase 0.000 86,354 22,433 
   Gift--after home purchase 21,535 79,021 36,469 
   Bequest--after home purchase 25,859 92,499 43,171 
Number of observations 1815 637 2452 
 
    Source: Survey Actifs Financiers 1992. 
 
 
 
